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INDIAN LAW IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT - EXPERIENCES IN THE 1980s AND
PREDICTIONS FOR THE 1990s*
Reid Peyton Chambers**
I was asked to make a presentation to the Federal Bar Association's annual
Indian Law Conference in April 1991 on Indian Law cases in the United States
Supreme Court. The seminal prior presentation on this subject had been made
to the 1980 conference by Louis F. Claibome, who was then Deputy Solicitor
General at the Department of Justice. In his capacity of representing the United
States before the Supreme Court, Louis had been instrumental in several of the
victories for Indian tribes before the Court in the 1960s and 1970s.'
This was a period during which the Court moved from considering one
Indian case every few years to deciding three or more Indian cases in most
Terms. This relative explosion of Indian cases in the Court's docket continued
through the 1980s. All in all, the Court's holdings during these years put flesh
on the skeleton of Indian law. The Court confirmed earlier rulings and the
invaluable scholarship of Felix Cohen2 that Indian tribes possessed inherent
governmental authority,3 that treaties reserve tribes water rights4 and reserve
rights to hunt and fish both within and outside reservations5 and that Indians
*This speech was delivered in April 1991 at the 16th Annual Federal Bar Association Indian
Law Conference and is republished here with the permission of the Federal Bar Association.
**Partner, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse & Endreson, Washington, D.C. B.A., 1962, Amherst
College; M.A., 1964, Oxford University; J.D., 1967, Harvard Law School.
1. E.g., Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); Washington
v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979);
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). Claiborne was a legendary oral advocate
before the Court. There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, of the following colloquy when he was
arguing the Menominee case:
Justice Black: Mr. Claiborne, you're just making this up as you go along, aren't
you?
Mr. Claiborne: Exactly so, Mr. Justice Black, just as you will have to do when
you write the opinion.
Justice Black did write the opinion, and Louis' position and that of the Tribe prevailed.
2. See generally FELIx S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Univ. of N.M.
photo. reprint 1970) (1942). Cohen was the Blackstone of the Indian law field, synthesizing 150
years of treaties, statutes, and cases in his monumental treatise.
3. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo Martinez, 436 U.S.
49 (1978), Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544
(1975). Earlier cases were Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), and Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
4. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963). The early case of Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), established the reserved
water rights doctrine.
5. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979);
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on reservations are generally not subject to state law.6 Moreover, the Court's
decisions in this time period resolved basic questions that had been
undetermined in the first two centuries of the Republic - such as whether
Indian tribes can punish non-Indians who commit crimes on Indian lands,7
whether tribes can tax non-Indian companies using Indian lands8 and whether
Indian tribes may bring suit in federal courts to assert their aboriginal title to
lands long occupied by states and private persons.'
In the middle of the fray during this formative period, based on his tenure
of many years in the Solicitor General's office, Louis Claiborne ventured in
1980 to predict how Indian law would develop in the years ahead. He foresaw
three subject areas - as of 1980 - where he believed the principles of Indian
law had been essentially established by the Court and would not be changed.
These principles were that: (1) tribes have self-governing authority over their
members and internal affairs on their reservations and the authority to maintain
independent governmental institutions; (2) tribal members on their own
reservations are subject to tribal law and will remain free from state regulatory
and taxing power; and (3) tribal rights reserved in treaties or by federal
common law to natural resources - rights to land, water and to hunt and
fish - are firmly anchored and will continue to be protected.
One purpose of my presentation in 1991 was to test the accuracy of these
three predictions against the Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s. I did this
aware that the 1980s had been a period where the Court continued to decide
an unusually large number of Indian cases, but where - unlike the 1960s and
1970s" - the majority of the cases in the 1980s were ones that tribal or
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S.
44 (1973); Mvlattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973). The early case of United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371 (1905), originally confirmed off-reservation treaty fishing rights.
6. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973);
Kennedy v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). These
cases carried forward the principles of earlier cases, such as The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 737 (1867), The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867), and Chief Justice
Marshall's landmark decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
7. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
8. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
9. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); see also Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979) (holding non-Indians have burden of persuasion in land
ownership disputes with Indians); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661
(1974); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
10. During the 1960s, the Court decided 11 cases involving Indian law; seven of these
decisions were generally favorable to Indians. See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN
INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAw 123-25 (1987). Professor Wilkinson does not classify the outcome
of the decisions. In my own view, the favorable decisions were Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546 (1963), upholding the reserved water rights of five Indian tribes to about 15% of the flow
of the lower Colorado River Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), confirming the
boundaries of the Colville Indian Reservation; Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S.
602 [Vol. 22
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Indian interests lost." Of course, unlike baseball, the ultimate issue is not
45 (1962), and Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), sustaining tribal fishing
rights; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Com'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965), striking down a
state gross receipts tax on income of a federally licensed trader selling goods to Indians on a
reservation; Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 (1968), sustaining the right of an Indian
allottee to bring suit in his own name to enforce an oil and gas lease on allotted lands; and Peoria
Tribe v. United States, 390 U.S. 468 (1968), sustaining a tribal treaty claim against the United
States.
The 1970s witnessed a tripling in the number of Indian cases decided by the Court, to 35
Indian law cases. VILKINSON, supra, at 125-29. By my reckoning, about two-thirds of these were
resolved in favor of the Indian interests. Clear victories include the following twenty decisions:
Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970), requiring the Interior Department to follow
normal administrative procedures, not subjective preferences, in approving will of Indian allottee;
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), sustaining tribes' title as against the State to
navigable riverbed; Kennedy v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971), McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenal Tribes, 425
U.S. 463 (1976), and Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), all striking down application
of state tax laws or court jurisdiction to Indians on reservations; Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S.
205 (1973), allowing Indians tried in federal court under Major Crimes Act to seek a jury
instruction on a lesser-included offense not enumerated as a crime in the Act; Mattz v. Amett,
412 U.S. 481 (1973), upholding continued existence of Klamath River Reservation and reserved
fishing rights; Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1974), Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975), and Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979), all sustaining treaty fishing rights against state
regulation; Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974), upholding right of
tribe to bring land claim in federal court; Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), allowing Indians
outside but near to Reservation to receive federal services benefitting Indians; Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974), upholding statutory Indian preference for positions in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), sustaining Congress' delegation of
authority to tribes to regulate liquor sales on reservation fee lands; Fisher v. District Court, 424
U.S. 382 (1976), sustaining tribal jurisdiction exclusive of states over domestic relations matters
involving reservation Indians; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), upholding tribal
authority to prosecute Indians for offenses committed on a reservation even where the United
States had previously prosecuted the Indian for the same offense; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49 (1978), holding tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims that tribes have
violated civil rights, except for habeas corpus petitions in criminal cases; United States v. John,
437 U.S. 634 (1978), invalidating state prosecution of crimes in a reservation; and Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979), sustaining tribal claim to riparian lands adjacent to
its reservation.
I also view three other decisions generally sustaining Congress' power to protect tribes and
their resources as at least qualified Indian victories - Delaware Business Committee v. Weeks,
430 U.S. 73 (1977); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Northern Cheyenne Tribe
v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976).
11. There were 44 Indian law cases decided by the Supreme Court during the 1980s. See
WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 129-32 for decisions through 1986 (listing 32 cases). There were
four Indian law decisions in 1987 - Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987);
California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S.
700 (1987), and Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). There were two in 1988 - Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Professional Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), and Employment Division
v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988). There were six in 1989 - Mississippi Choctaw Band v.
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989),
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simply the number of wins and losses. The key question was whether these
decisions portended a shift in basic underlying doctrine away from the
protection of Indian rights that had generally been the hallmark of the Court's
Indian law decisions in the immediately previous two decades.
In the three areas Louis Claiborne believed the legal principles were
clearly established, I thought in 1991 and think now there had been no basic
changes worked by the Court's decisions in the 1980s - that indeed, at least
in the tribal government area, the court's decisions confirmed broader powers
than seemed assured in 1979. For example, two decisions of the Court
buttressed the authority of tribal courts to resolve civil disputes on
Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
the Yakima Indian Reservation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); California v. United States, 490 U.S. 920
(1989), and Oklahoma Tax Commn v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989).
At most, 20 of the Court's decisions in the 1980s were favorable to Indians: United States v.
Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980), invalidating taking of Indian allotments by state through inverse
condemnation; Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134, 152-54 (1980) was favorable to the extent it upheld tribal power to tax transactions with
non-Indians on trust lands, accord Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Kerr
McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (upholding exclusive tribal authority to regulate hunting and fishing
on reservations); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Central
Machinery Corp. v. Arizona State Tax Common, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), and Ramah Navajo Sch.
Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), all invalidating state taxes on non-Indians doing
business with tribes on reservations; United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983), holding the
United States to a fiduciary duty with respect to timber management, and United States v. Sioux
Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), requiring the United States to pay Fifth Amendment Compensation
for taking Indian lands protected by treaty; Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), holding the
boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation were not altered by a statute opening reservation
lands to homesteaders; Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138 (1984), and Three
Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986), requiring state courts to consider suits
brought by tribes as a matter of federal law; County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226 (1985), holding tribes have a cause of action under federal law to assert land claim; Montana
v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985), invalidating state tax on tribal oil and gas royalties;
National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), requiring exhaustion of tribal court remedies as prerequisite to
suit in federal court on matters arising on reservation; California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202
(1987), holding tribes may operate bingo and card games on reservations without regulation by
states; Mississippi Choctaw Tribe v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), holding that the Indian Child
Welfare Act preempts state authority to order adoption of Indian children domiciled on a
reservation, and Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), affirmning that tribes hold
reserved water rights.
In addition, one can plausibly view Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) - holding that an
Act of Congress providing for escheat to tribes of small fractional interest of allotted lands is an
unconstitutional taking - is a qualified Indian victory. Also, Escondido Mutual Water Co. v.
LaJolla Band, 466 U.S. 765 (1984), was a partial victory because it sustained the authority of the
Interior Department to impose mandatory conditions on federally licensed hydroelectric projects
using Indian lands. On the other hand, the Colville case, 447 U.S. at 154-62, was a partial loss
since it peritted state taxation of sales by smokeshops to non-Indians and Indians not enrolled




reservations - building on Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,2 and United
States v. Wheeler 3 - by holding that federal (and implicitly state) courts
should abstain even in cases involving reservation affairs where they have
concurrent jurisdiction in favor of tribal court adjudication. These
decisions indicated that the tribal courts should initially determine the
question of whether tribal jurisdiction exists over non-Indians. In addition,
in 1979 it was uncertain whether the Court would apply its 1978 decision in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe5 - which had held that tribes have
been implicitly divested on criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians - to
preclude exercise of tribal civil regulatory, taxing or adjudication jurisdiction
over non-Indians on reservations. The tribal court abstention cases 6
confirmed some degree of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over cases with
non-Indian parties. Three other decisions in the 1980s confirmed tribes'
power to tax non-Indians entering into business transactions with Indians on
trust lands, 7 and one decision confirmed tribal regulatory powers over non-
Indians entering trust lands to hunt or fish. 8 It is fair to say that at the end
of the 1980s, tribal powers of self-government were if anything more firmly
anchored than at the beginning of the decade.
I think the same is true with respect to the principle that reservation Indians
are immune from state regulatory control or taxation. The Supreme Court
strongly reaffirmed this immunity in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker,9 where after setting forth the basic legal structure of prior cases, the
Court concluded that "[t]he unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make
it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes
those standards of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the law.""
Thus, the Court held it was unnecessary to find "an express congressional
statement" that a particular state law has been preempted.2' Rather, it observed
12. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
13. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
14. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa Mutual Ins.
Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
15. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
16. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa Mutual Ins.
Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
17. Kerr McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1980).
18. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). Montana v. United
States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981), readily acknowledged this authority as well on trust lands, but
held that tribes had lost the power to regulate non-Indians hunting or fishing on reservation fee
lands, except where the non-Indians had entered into consensual relations with the tribe or their
activities threatened or directly affected the political integrity, economic security or the health or
welfare of the tribe.
19. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
20. ld. at 144.
21. Id.
No. 2]
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that "[w]hen on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at issue, state law
is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory interest is likely to be
minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its
strongest. '
An exceedingly important decision following Bracker- both doctrinally and
in terms of its impact on Indian economic development - was California v.
Cabazon Band,72 where the Court held that tribes could operate bingo and card
games without following state regulatory standards. After Cabazon, Congress
enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,' establishing standards for conduct
of tribal gaming, including casino gaming. In the decade since Cabazon, more
than one hundred tribes have established casinos, netting several billion dollars
a year in revenues and providing tens of thousands of jobs for Indians and non-
Indians. Indeed, many tribes have lifted their entire tribal membership out of
poverty.
Equally important from a doctrinal point of view, the Court also invalidated
Montana's tax on tribal oil and gas royalties, reaffirming the principles of
Bracker, Cabazon and earlier cases that states generally have no regulatory
authority over tribes or Indians on reservations unless Congress has expressly
authorized that regulation. The Court's decision in Rice v. Rehner9 in 1983
forged a lone exception to this principle where Indian activities on a reservation
would cause very unusual and demonstrable harm to non-Indians on or
surrounding the reservation and where Congress had generally delegated
authority to states over a subject matter that tribes had no tradition of
controlling. In Rice, the Court required an Indian selling liquor on a reservation
to obtain a state liquor license, reasoning that the on-reservation Indian activity
could gravely impact non-Indians and because states had been recognized by
Congress and in the Twenty-First Amendment as having important coordinate
responsibilities for liquor regulation and control along with the federal
govemmOntY
The third area where Louis Claibome predicted that Indian rights would
remain secure was in natural resources. Decisions in the 1980s generally
22. Id.
23. Califomia v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
24. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988).
25. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
26. 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
27. While Rice applies only in "the narrow context of liquor regulation," Rice, 463 U.S. 713
at 722, 733, and the case has not been used in the ensuing 14 years to allow additional state
authority over reservation Indians, it remains unfortunate that the Court in Rice crafted an area
where states could exercise jurisdiction over Indians at all on a reservation absent specific
congressional consent. The Court's decision in Rice is especially puzzling because an act of
Congress, 18 U.S.C. § 1161, which allowed liquor sales on reservations so long as they adhered
to "state" standards, was apparently read by the Court as furnishing explicit congressional consent
to state regulation of tribal liquor sales. If that is a correct construction of the statute, it would




vindicated that view, although the Court did so at times by the slimmest of
majorities. One of the most important Indian cases in the decade was Oneida
Indian Nation v. County of Oneida." Oneida - a 5-4 decision - holds that
a tribe may sue in federal court to vindicate its aboriginal title - without
respect to state law barriers such as statutes of limitation or laches. In the other
major resources case of the 1980s, Wyoming v. United States,' an equally
divided court affirmed without opinion the continued application of the
practicable irrigable acreage standard of Arizona v. California,3" leaving the
basic doctrine of federal reserved rights unchanged. Both decisions accord with
Claibome's general prediction. However, the Court did hold that earlier water
rights decrees affecting tribes were binding, even where the tribes had not been
adequately represented by the United States.3 ' And the Court held that federal
courts should ordinarily defer to state court jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian
water rights so long as the state court also adjudicated all non-Indian rights in
a watershed as well'
Claibome predicted that the major unsettled Indian law issue to be resolved
in the 1980s was tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. Claibome predicted
the most favorable outcome Indians could expect - after the Court held in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe33 that tribes had no criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians - would be that the Court would sustain tribal authority over
non-Indians on trust lands and preclude state authority over non-Indians engaged
in commercial or other interactions with Indians on trust lands. He doubted that
tribes would be allowed to tax or regulate non-Indians on fee lands. The law
developed slightly differently than Claibome had hoped.
First, as noted, tribal taxing authority on non-Indian activities on trust lands
now appears secure because of four decisions on the 1980s0' However, the
Court did not preclude state authority in every circumstance where non-Indians
do commerce with tribes or Indians on reservation trust lands. In some of these
circumstances, the Court has precluded concurrent state authority,35 but other
28. 470 U.S. 226 (1985). The Court reached an opposite result in South Carolina v. Catawba
Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498 (1986), but Congress had specifically authorized application of the
state statute of limitations to that tribe's lands.
29. 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
30. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
31. Arizona v. California II, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983).
32. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
33. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
34. Washington v. Confederated Colville Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); United States v.
Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Kerr
McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
35. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Central Mach. Corp.
v. Arizona State Tax Conrn'n, 448 U.S. 150 (1980); Ranah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983);
California v. Cabazon Band, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
No. 2]
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cases have upheld state taxation of non-Indians doing commerce with Indians
on reservation trust lands' The Court has essentially adopted a balancing test
that weighs the corresponding interests of the United States and the tribes in
protecting the commerce from state taxation or regulation against a state's
interest in regulating or taxing it. As the Court explained in White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker
[W]here, as here, a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-
Indians engaging in activity on the reservation . . . we have
examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes
in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the
notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions
of tribal independence. This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical
or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called
for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and
tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether,
in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate
federal law.37
The Court in Bracker employed this "particularized inquiry" test and held the
State could not tax a non-Indian timber contractor hauling timber for a tribal
enterprise on BIA and tribal roads." The Court emphasized that the State was
"unable to identify any regulatory function or service performed by the State
that would justify the assessment of taxes for (these) activities."
In virtually all subsequent cases involving state taxes on or regulation of non-
Indians doing business with Indians, the Court has used this "particularized
inquiry into the nature of the State, Federal and tribal interests at stake... to
determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would
violate federal law." The outcome of any individual case involving state
regulation of non-Indian mineral lessees thus turns on a weighing of those
interests. Unfortunately, this is a very fact specific test and it is hard to predict
in advance how the Court or lower federal courts will balance the interests in
a particular fact situation. The result has been a clash of regulatory schemes and
"double taxation" of transactions in some instances, i.e., where the Court allows
concurrent taxing authority. This outcome seriously complicates and discourages
economic activity in Indian country. At the very least, the balancing test
produces uncertainty which encourages litigation between tribes and states. The
36. Washington v. Confederated Colville Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
37. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45 (emphasis added).
38. Exemption from state taxes was sought only "for operations ... conducted solely on
Bureau and tribal roads within the reservation." Id. at 148. Taxes were paid where state highways




test is so fact dependent that neither a tribe nor a state can predict the outcome
of a close case.
In my view, the Court was wrong to reject the "bright-line" rule Claiborne
advocated that would have prohibited state authority over commerce with
Indians on reservations under the Indian Commerce Clause. The Court
specifically considered that proposition when it was argued by the Solicitor
General in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 8 and rejected
it. I think that was unwise, both because it established a murky test with bad
results and as a matter of legal analysis. In my view, "commerce with the
Indian tribes" is much more closely akin to foreign commerce - where federal
authority is exclusive - than to interstate commerce. Under this view, state
taxation or regulation of commerce between Indians and non-Indians on
reservation trust lands should be precluded unless expressly authorized by
Congress. The constitutional inquiry should center around the purpose of each
component of the Commerce Clause. The chief purpose of the interstate
commerce clause is to require equality in each state's treatment of its own
commerce and that of its sister states. A free trade zone is established.
Protectionist measures are prohibited. By contrast, the purposes of the Indian
commerce clause are different. The very reason for the clause is to protect
Indians and Indian commerce. In the vintage case of United States v. Forty
Three Gallons of Whiskey,3 the Court so held in contrasting the power of
Congress and the states over Indians under the Articles of Confederation and
under the Constitution. It observed that in the Articles, "two limitations were
placed upon the power of Congress over Indian affairs: the Indians must not be
members of any State, nor must Congress do anything to violate or infringe the
legislative right of a State within its own limits." The Court concluded that:
[O]f necessity, these limitations rendered the power of no practical
value. This was seen by the Convention which framed the
Constitution.. . The only efficient way of dealing with the Indian
Tribes was to place them under the protection of the General
Government. Their peculiar habits and character required this ....
Thus, state control over Indian commerce under the Articles was
replaced by the Constitution which "provid[ed] that intercourse and
trade with the Indians should be carried on solely under the
authority of the United States.'
In United States v. Fory-Three Gallons of Whiskey,2 the Court also
observed that the "power to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes... [is]
as broad as that to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Like foreign
238. 458 U.S. 832, 845-46 (1982).,
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commerce, Indian commerce involves political relationships which have from
the beginning always been peculiarly the province of the federal
government. 'uz
As with state taxation of foreign commerce, the Indian commerce cases have
continued to adhere to the standard that there must be "no detraction whatever
from sovereignty" as a result of the state tax or regulation. 3 Since an
exclusive federal power to deal with other sovereigns is involved in both the
Indian and foreign commerce power, there should be no room for state
regulation or taxation of that commerce absent Congress's express consent.
Unfortunately, the Court held otherwise.
On the question of tribal jurisdiction on reservations outside trust lands, the
major decisions in the 1980s were Montana v. United States4 and Brendale
v. Confederated Yakima Tribes.4S Although there was no clear majority
opinion in Brendale, the upshot of these cases seemed to be as Claibome
predicted - that tribes can regulate non-Indian activities on fee lands if these
activities substantially impact surrounding Indians and Indian lands, and not
otherwise.
Addendum
I predicted in 1991 that the Indian law cases would continue to develop along
the lines described by Claiborne. A corollary prediction I made in 1991 was that
there would probably be fewer Indian law cases decided by the Court in the
1990s. I thought this because much substantive doctrine in federal Indian law
appeared established as a result of the nearly 100 Supreme Court decisions in
Indian law from 1960 to 1989. Thus, I believed "Indian law" was becoming a
mature and more well-settled field, instead of one where there are many major
uncertain questions and the possibility (indeed, the need) for trail breaking court
decisions to develop new law. I also thought there would be less need for
plenary review of lower court decisions by the Court, since the basic doctrine
was generally settled. It was even possible that, if (as I think) Indian law
doctrine is becoming more stable and well-settled, a higher percentage of the
decisions in cases in the Court does take would be unanimous, or nearly so.
Finally, I thought the "action" in Indian law during the 1990s could well shift
increasingly from the courts to Congress.
Although I leave it to Douglas Endreson to describe the events of the 1990s
in his article, I think these predictions proved generally correct.
242. Id.
243. Compare Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 36 (1948) with Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1958) ("Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them.").
244. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
245. 4 92 U.S. 408 (1989).
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